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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic is imposing enormous global challenges in
managing the spread of the virus. A key pillar to mitigation is contact
tracing, which complements testing and isolation. Digital apps for con-
tact tracing using Bluetooth technology available in smartphones have
gained prevalence globally. In this article, we discuss various capabilities
of such digital contact tracing, and its implication on community safety
and individual privacy, among others. We further describe the GoCoro-
naGo institutional contact tracing app that we have developed, and the
conscious and sometimes contrarian design choices we have made. We
offer a detailed overview of the app, backend platform and analytics, and
our early experiences with deploying the app to over 1000 users within
the Indian Institute of Science campus in Bangalore. We also highlight
research opportunities and open challenges for digital contact tracing and
analytics over temporal networks constructed from them.
1 Introduction
Contagious viral diseases such as the SARS-CoV (2002), H1N1 (2009), MERS-
CoV (2012), and SARS-CoV-2 (2019) have resulted in global epidemic out-
breaks and placed a massive burden on public health systems around the world.
These pandemics have cascading effects that result in irreparable consequences
∗Pre-print of article to appear in the Journal of the Indian Institute of Science
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to economies and quality of life. The recent SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19 pan-
demic has triggered national and regional lockdowns across the world to curb
the spread of the virus. With incubation periods that last days and with a
significant fraction of asymptomatic carriers, the proliferation of the disease has
been hard to detect and localize. Further, testing of populations at a large
scale has proved challenging due to limited testing kits, well-trained health-care
professionals, and funds in emerging economies [42].
To tackle this problem, governments and health workers use Contact Trac-
ing of infected individuals to identify those who may have come in contact with
them, also called primary contacts. These primary contacts are then quarantined
and/or tested depending on their symptoms. Testing, tracing, and isolation
form essential components of COVID-19 management, besides preventive mea-
sures like wearing masks, practising Social Distancing and washing hands [39].
Traditional methods of contact tracing are often laborious and may be erro-
neous due to recall biases [2, 38]. Also, human activity patterns often involve
interactions with strangers, especially when travelling, which makes it difficult
to identify contacts using traditional methods.
As a large fraction of the population owns smartphones, countries around the
world, including India, have attempted to use Digital Contact Tracing [5,19,29].
Mobile apps that use Bluetooth technology are deployed to record close inter-
actions between users. These Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) apps typically ad-
vertise a unique device ID, which can be recognized by other nearby devices
with the app that scan for and save these advertised IDs, also called contacts.
This information is typically stored on the local device; if a user tests positive,
their Bluetooth contacts are uploaded to a central database and their contacts
are alerted. This can dramatically reduce the time required for contact tracing
from days to potentially hours, thereby mitigating the spread of the virus [38].
Examples of such national-scale apps include Aarogya Setu [45] in India, Trace-
Together [47] in Singapore, COVIDSafe [24] in Australia, COVID Alert1 in
Canada, Corona-Warn-App2 in Germany, etc.
However, there are limitations to digital contact tracing. These constraints
include the low reliability and asymmetry of Bluetooth technology in detecting
nearby users [26,40,46,60]; low accuracy of the proximity distance between users
to help distinguish nearby and farther off users [40,46]; high degree of adoption
required for digital contact tracing to be effective [33, 48]; and the inability to
locate secondary and tertiary contacts until the primary and secondary contacts
test positive, respectively. It is hence still important to use complementary
digital contact tracing with manual methods.
In this article, we describe GoCoronaGo (GCG) 3, a digital contact tracing
app for institutions, which attempts to address these limitations. A key dis-
tinction of our approach is to collect the contact trace data of devices into a
1COVID Alert App, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/
diseases/coronavirus-disease-covid-19/covid-alert.html
2Corona-Warn-App, https://www.coronawarn.app/en/
3Latest details for GoCoronaGo and its download link is available at https://
GoCoronaGo.app
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centralized database, continuously, irrespective of if or when a person is diag-
nosed as COVID positive. This proximity data of all app users is used to build a
temporal contact graph, where vertices are devices, and edges indicate proximity
between devices for a certain time period and with a certain Bluetooth signal
strength.
This approach has several benefits. When a GCG user is tested positive
for COVID-19, we use graph algorithms to rapidly identify primary, secondary,
and other higher-order contacts, based on WHO guidelines [2]. Further, even
if the Bluetooth scans were missed by the infected user, successful scans by
other proximate devices can be used to alert the relevant contacts, increasing
the reliability of detection. In addition, centralized digital contact tracing has
the potential to estimate the state of the population using network-based SEIR
models, which can be used to assign risk scores and prioritize testing [28,37,55].
Of course, centralized contact data collection has its downsides, primarily,
the privacy implications of tracking the interactions between a large number
of individuals. We take several precautions to mitigate this. One, the app is
designed for deployment only within institutions and closed campuses, and not
at a city, regional, or national scale. The data collected is owned by the host
institution and not by a central authority. Two, users do not have to share any
personal information, and devices are identified using a randomly generated ID.
Sharing GPS location or their phone number is voluntary and through opt-in.
Lastly, deanonymization of data is limited to COVID-19 contact tracing and, by
design, requires multiple entities to cooperate, and is overseen by an advisory
board with a broad representation from the institution. We discuss these pros
and cons in more detail later.
Besides a centralized data collection approach, we also conduct experiments
to understand the impact of various smartphone devices and the environment on
the Bluetooth signal strength to better ascertain the proximity between devices.
We also send proactive messages for users to enable custom Bluetooth settings
in their smartphone to improve reliability. The use of the GCG App within an
institutional setting, with data collection and usage governed by the organiza-
tion, may lead to higher adoption of the app, and enhance its effectiveness in
contact tracing.
This article examines the design rationale, architecture, and our experience
in deploying the GoCoronaGo digital contact tracing app as part of a pilot
at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc). It also discusses the challenges and
opportunities in improving the utility of digital contact tracing.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review digi-
tal contact tracing and provide an overview of a few popular COVID-19 apps.
Section 3 provides details of the app design and the backend architecture. In
Section 4, we describe various analytics, including temporal contact network
algorithms, for contact tracing, and for providing feedback to app users. Fi-
nally, Section 5 summarizes our experience with deploying the app at IISc, and
highlights some of the opportunities and challenges of digital contact tracing.
3
2 Background and Related Work
2.1 Contact Tracing
Infectious diseases, that spread through person-to-person interactions, can be
contained by tracking their sources and quarantining the individuals who are
or may be affected. This is typically done using physical interviews, which
try to determine the places visited and the people met by the patient [2]. In
some cases, the location history of the patients is shared by cities and public
health agencies on websites and mobile apps to allow others who were in the
vicinity at that time to take precautions. This form of contact tracing relies
heavily on one’s memory and collecting such data manually is cumbersome.
Contact tracing is crucial, especially for viruses such as the SARS-CoV-2 that
exhibit high transmission rates, low testing rates, long incubation times, and a
significant fraction of asymptomatic carriers, who could infect other susceptible
individuals [13,29,31].
Digital contact tracing, on the other hand, involves the use of technology
to keep track of the individuals who came in close proximity with each other.
It has been shown to be effective in preventing the spread of communicable
diseases in livestock [34,49], but experiments involving human populations have
been limited [53]. The scale at which COVID-19 has spread has led to the use of
Bluetooth and GPS-based contact tracing applications on mobile phones, which
help individuals automatically keep a record of the places they visited and the
people they met, along with the timestamps. This permits us to build contact
neighborhoods that can be used to alert or quarantine the concerned individuals
and identify potentially risky interactions.
2.2 Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19
Most digital contact tracing apps for COVID-19 rely on Bluetooth technology
available on smartphones. In addition, a few apps collect the GPS location of
users. The rapid spread of the COVID-19 virus has led to the development
of a variety of smartphone apps around the world, which are variants on this
theme. Examples include both national apps like Aarogya Setu (India), NHSX
(UK), and Covid Safe (Australia), as well as those proposed by institutions, like
NOVID (CMU) and SafePaths (MIT). A review of contact tracing apps can be
found in [11,15,19,41].
At a broad level, these apps scan and advertise for Bluetooth signals and
record the timestamp, along with the signal strength or the Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI), reported in decibel-milliwatts (dBm) in Android 4.
The RSSI values are negative and higher when the devices are close to each
other. Translating the Bluetooth RSSI to proximity distances for contact trac-
ing is not straightforward since it depends on numerous factors such as the
phone hardware, drivers, operating system, ability to run continuously in the
4ScanResult for Bluetooth LE scan, https://developer.android.com/reference/
kotlin/android/bluetooth/le/ScanResult
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background, and interference due to surfaces. Yet, they have been widely at-
tempted and deployed because of its potential advantages over manual contact
tracing.
In fact, to address some of the interoperability issues across Android phones
and iPhones, Google and Apple have even introduced an exposure notifications
(GAEN) protocol into their OS as part of their COVID-19 response [6]. The
BlueTrace protocol [16] used by apps in Singapore and Australia is another
popular standard. Europe has two competing contact tracing standards that are
being refined, Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (dp3t) [56]
and Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) [7]. The
Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) is also working on a contact tracing
standard for wearables [18]. Such protocols help with mobility across national
boundaries, avoid having to install multiple apps, and in the development of
custom, yet interoperable, apps.
Besides smartphone-based apps, others have also developed hardware devices
such as the TraceTogether token [25] that uses Bluetooth, but operates inde-
pendently of a phone, or wearables like wristwatches that can track the location
using GPS [4]. In addition to Bluetooth, a few apps like NOVID also broadcast
ultrasound signals using a phone’s speakers and other apps in the vicinity detect
them using their microphone [43]. There have also been other digital apps such
as the NZ COVID Tracer that use QR codes for users to check-in when they
enter specific locations [9]. Besides contact tracing, digital tools have also been
used to track symptoms among populations to identify emerging “hotspots” and
for health professionals and volunteers to coordinate their response [5].
However, the global adoption of contact tracing apps is low. The percent-
age of the population who have installed such apps has struggled to go past
20%, even among developed countries where a majority of the individuals have
smartphones [21]. While there is debate on the minimal adoption rate required
for contact tracing apps to have a tangible effect, some use is better than none
and more is better [33, 38, 48]. In particular, higher adoption rates in dense
neighbourhoods can highlight the effectiveness of tracing effective since the risk
of spreading the infection is greater in closely-knit communities.
2.3 Balancing Community Safety and Individual Privacy
There are a number of ways in which one can design such digital contact tracing
apps. These offer different trade-offs in terms of individual privacy and the
health and safety of the community.
2.3.1 National vs. Institutional Use
The target of the app may be for national/regional use or institutional use.
While national-scale contact tracing apps potentially offer greater ability to
manage the pandemic, they also carry greater risks of data leaks and misuse [62].
Further, a high degree of adoption at such large scales is challenging, limiting
the usefulness of the app for contact tracing. Apps deployed at an institutional
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scale can be better targeted to the audience and offer better uptake due to the
fact that the data is managed at the organizational level. Institutions can also
respond more rapidly based on insights provided by the app. But they are less
effective when users are moving outside the confines of campuses and interacting
with the broader population. E.g., apps like Aarogya Setu and TraceTogether
are national apps, while GoCoronaGo, NOVID, and Covid Watch are designed
for institutions.
2.3.2 Voluntary vs. Mandatory
The use of the app may be voluntary or mandatory. Some countries like China
have made such apps mandatory for all residents, or for those meeting certain
requirements such as travelers. Even organizations may make such national or
institutional apps mandatory within their premises. But most countries and
institutions tend to keep the use of such apps voluntary. Further, the use of
the collected data for contact tracing may also be voluntary or mandatory. If
voluntary, there is an explicit opt-in by the individual who is tested COVID
positive or is quarantined, before contact tracing using their data can be initi-
ated. Alternatively, there may be rules in place that allow the government or
institutions to use any proximity data that is available with them, without ad-
ditional consent from infected users. An explicit consent helps address concerns
of social stigma around COVID patients. The use of GCG is strictly volun-
tary, and there is an additional consent required by a user who is infected with
COVID-19 before their data can be used for contact tracing – this, despite their
data already being available centrally in the backend.
2.3.3 Identifiable vs. Anonymized
Apps may collect identifiable, strictly-anonymous, or pseudo-anonymous infor-
mation as part of contact tracing. Some apps like Singapore’s TraceTogether
compulsorily require the contact details and/or a national identification number
to be shared when installing the app. This makes it quicker to reach-out to users
during contact tracing, but also heightens the risk of misusing the data for the
surveillance of specific individuals and can lead to a significant loss of privacy if
the data is breached. In a strictly anonymous setting, no personal information
of the user is collected, and they are only identified by a random ID, which
itself may also be changed (or “rotated”) periodically. A set of such IDs may be
provided by a central server (TraceTogether) or generated locally by the App.
During contact tracing, the user’s app is alerted and they have the option of
voluntarily responding by contacting the health center or a government agency.
If the user uninstalls the app, it may be impossible to do contact tracing. A
hybrid approach of pseudo-anonymization ensures that the contact trace data
itself is anonymous, but the information required for de-anonymization is avail-
able with a trusted independent authority whose consent is required (optionally,
with a consent from the infected individual) to identify the users relevant for
contact tracing. GCG adopts this hybrid model that balances the privacy of
7
users while also enabling rapid and reliable outreach during contact tracing.
2.3.4 Centralized vs. De-centralized
The contact tracing data may be kept de-centralized, semi-centralized, or cen-
tralized. If de-centralized, the Bluetooth device IDs observed by a user’s app are
stored locally on the device. When a user tests positive for COVID-19 they can
inform a backend service of their device ID (potentially, multiple IDs, in case of
ID rotation) and their status. The backend periodically relays a list of device
IDs associated with COVID positive individuals to all apps, which is then used
by the user to verify if they came in contact with a COVID positive person.
This is used by PACT [51] and Google-Apple exposure notification (GAEN)
framework [54].
In a semi-centralized approach, a mapping between an app and its device
ID is maintained centrally, but the contact trace data remains locally on the
device. On testing positive, a user may choose to (or be required to) upload the
contact trace data for the recent past to a backend service, which then sends
notifications to these primary contact devices asking them to quarantine or get
tested. Examples of this approach include BlueTrace [16] and Aarogya Setu [45].
However, Aarogya Setu also allows users to voluntarily upload their Bluetooth
contact data to central servers at any time to get an estimate of other high-risk
users in the vicinity.
Lastly, in a centralized approach, both the mapping of apps to device IDs
as well as their contacts are sent to a backend service periodically. When a user
reports themselves as COVID positive, contact tracing can be initiated on the
centralized data already available, optionally after an additional consent. GCG
adopts this model. This variant is relatively intrusive, but arguably has advan-
tages that may justify its use. One, contact data from both the infected and the
proximate users can be combined to increase the reliability of contact tracing.
Two, even if users uninstall the app, if the data collected is personalized or is
de-anonymizable, then contact tracing can still happen over the backend data
for the period during which the app was kept installed. Three, not just primary
but even secondary and tertiary contact tracing can be performed rapidly. And
four, having a centralized model allows us to perform temporal analytics on a
global contact network. This can help identify high-risk individuals for prioritiz-
ing preventive, testing and (future) vaccination strategies, and infer the health
of the user population.
2.3.5 Location data and longevity
Bluetooth data provides the relative interaction between proximate users but
in itself does not reveal the spatial location of users. While this may disclose
interaction patterns between (anonymous) users, which is necessary for con-
tact tracing, correlating this with particular individuals is not possible without
additional out-of-band knowledge about them.
Some contact tracing apps may also collect GPS data (COVID SafePaths)
8
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Figure 1: Overall Design of GCG
and data from beacons or QR codes (NOVID) that may reveal the absolute
spatial location of the users. Collecting spatial location has some benefits. The
coronavirus may be transmitted through surfaces or be suspended in the air,
and thereby be passed on to others who are not near an infected user but in
the same location soon after [57]. Bluetooth based proximity will miss such
users. Also, GPS data collection may be more reliable than Bluetooth. How-
ever, GPS is not precise enough to be useful for identifying proximity between
users. Furthermore, tracking the spatial movements of users continuously can
have serious privacy consequences [50,52]. Bluetooth Beacons and scanning QR
Codes present at well-known locations can also provide such spatial information,
but will be limited to places where the beacons or codes are deployed. GCG
allows users to optionally share their GPS data through an explicit opt-in, and
also allows the selective use of beacons deployed by institutions.
Lastly, we need to consider the duration for which the centralized or de-
centralized data that is collected is retained. This needs to be explicitly stated
by the apps for transparency. More the data that is collected and more per-
sonalized it is, greater are the consequences for retaining it longer, especially
in a centralized or semi-centralized setting. Typically, the contact trace data
itself is useful only for roughly 30 days after it is collected since this duration is
typically the outer time-window of transmission of the virus. Also, there should
be clarity on how long the data is retained after a user uninstalls the app. GCG
deletes a user’s phone number, the only personal data they may share, from its
backend within 3 months of them uninstalling the app. The anonymized contact
trace data is retained for future research purposes, as per the rules set out by
the Institute Human Ethics Committee (IHEC).
3 GCG Architecture
The GoCoronaGo (GCG) contact tracing platform consists of a smartphone app
and backend services for data collection, management, and analysis. The app
is designed for COVID-19 operations and management within an institution,
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and is also proposed as a research project governed by the Institute Human
Ethics Committee (IHEC). The design and technical details of the app and the
backend services are described in this section. A high-level design is illustrated
in Figure 1.
3.1 Design of the GCG Smart Phone App
3.1.1 App Installation and User Registration
The GCG App is limited for use by authorized institutions. Since not all insti-
tutions may have a private/enterprise app store for their organizations, hosting
the app in the public Google Play or Apple App store is convenient. Users at au-
thorized institutions are provided with individual invitation codes by a separate
entity within the institution, typically the information technology (IT) office.
The IT office also maintains a mapping from the user’s unique invite code to
the actual individual to whom the code was provided, along with their contact
details, as shown in Figure 2. This mapping from the individual to their invita-
tion code is later used by the IT office during contact tracing, as described in
Section 4.3. The user can download the GCG App from the Google Play Store
or from an institutional download link. During installation, users enter this
invite code into the app, which submits and validates it with the GCG backend
servers and is returned a unique ID, a device ID, and a PIN.
The GCG backend maintains the mapping from the invite code to the unique
ID for the installed device. The invitation code can only be used once by
the user for the first installation. To allow future re-installations, a PIN is
generated for this invitation code and is shared with the user. Optionally, the
user may provide their one-time password (OTP)-verified phone number during
installation, which is recorded in the backend. This number can be used along
with the PIN to reinstall the app in the future, in place of the one-time-use invite
code. Lastly, a device ID in the form of a random 128 bit UUID is generated by
the backend for each re/installation on a phone, and a mapping is maintained
from the unique ID to the device ID, along with the creation timestamp. This
device ID will be broadcast as part of the Bluetooth advertisement (Figure 2).
Both the invite code to unique ID, and unique ID to device ID mappings are
used during contact tracing (Section 4.3).
A final piece of information collected from the app during re/installation
is the make and model of the phone. As we discuss later, this is vital for
interpreting the Bluetooth signal strength and translating it into a distance
estimate.
These identifiers are designed to maintain the anonymity of users from the
GCG App and backend, enable de-anonymization of contact users upon an au-
thorized request for contact tracing, and ensure that the app can be re/installed
by authorized users. Such sandboxing and identifier-indirection ensures that no
single entity – the IT Office, a GCG user, or the GCG backend – can indepen-
dently find the identity of any (other) user and their trace.
A key tenet of GCG is transparency. The installation process in the GCG
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Figure 2: Identifier mapping during GCG App Installation
App has disclosures on the legal terms and conditions for the use of the app, and
on how the data collected will be used. In addition, there is also a multi-lingual
informed consent, as required by IHEC, which clearly documents the scope of
the research project, potential benefits and downsides, voluntary participation,
etc.
3.1.2 BLE Advertisement and Scanning
The GCG App uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) signals to detect other proxi-
mate phones running the app. The BLE wireless protocol is ubiquitous among
smartphones sold within the last 6 years. It enables low power, short-range wire-
less communication, and is intended for applications in fitness, smart homes,
healthcare, beacons, etc. Its maximum range is < 100 m [17] though this is
affected by environmental conditions and transmitting power, and ≈ 10 m is
the typical range [40].
BLE devices use an advertising and scanning protocol to discover each other
and establish a connection. When acting as a server, the devices advertise one
or more services that they support, which are identified by service assigned
numbers; when acting as a client, they find servers to connect, to based on the
advertised service assigned numbers.5 A single device may advertise multiple
services, and it can include a custom payload such as a service name. Also,
the BLE advertisement is broadcast in an open channel, which any nearby BLE
client can discover. Besides standard 16 bit service numbers that are registered
and pre-defined for specific types of services, applications can also generate and
use 128 bit UUIDs for custom services they provide. Once discovered, clients can
establish a network connection with the service to perform additional operations
5Bluetooth GATT Service Assigned Numbers, https://www.bluetooth.com/
specifications/gatt/services/
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such as data exchange.
The GCG App acts as both a client and a server when using the scanning
and advertising capabilities of BLE, respectively. Specifically, it advertises two
service assigned numbers, 0x1800 which represents a Generic Access service,
and another custom service whose assigned number is the unique device ID for
a particular app installation. This advertisement is broadcast continuously. As
a client, the GCG App scans for 5 secs in every minute for advertisements
that contain the service number 0x1800. If found, it extracts and records the
device ID that is sent as a secondary service number in the same advertisement.
Piggy-backing the device ID as a service assigned number rather than a custom
payload takes fewer bytes, which in turn can reduce the power consumption for
the advertisement.
As part of the scanning, the GCG App also retrieves the Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI), which is the strength of the BLE signal that is re-
ceived by the app. As we discuss later, this can be used to estimate the proximity
distance.
The GCG Android App uses the default BLE settings for broadcasting its
advertisements6, which translates to BLE broadcasts every 1 sec at a medium
transmission power level. Also, the app consciously does not establish a con-
nection with apps on another device; the device ID is broadcast to any BLE
device that is in the vicinity. In fact, we explicitly set the connectable flag on
the advertisement to false. This enhances security by avoiding malicious content
from being transferred.
3.1.3 Support for GPS and beacon locations
While such proximity tracking is helpful for contact tracing of individuals who
were spatiotemporally co-located, this does not address situations where two
users shared the same space, such as an ATM, mess dining hall, or campus
grocery, but for a short time apart. Since COVID-19 can be transmitted through
surfaces and can linger in the air for some time [57], it is beneficial to identify
users who were in the same location but not at the same time, especially for
locations with a lot of footfall.
The GCG App allows users to voluntarily share their GPS location infor-
mation with the backend. This is disabled by default. If enabled by the user,
the GPS location is retrieved and uploaded to the backend every 5 mins, and
buffered for retries.
Since the sharing of GPS location is strictly voluntary, GCG supports the
selective use of beacons installed by institutions at such high-risk spaces. These
beacons behave like a GCG App that passively advertises its device ID, and
the smartphone app can scan for and record the beacon’s ID, just as it would
detect another GCG smart phone’s device ID. Specifically, we use the iBeacon
protocol from Apple. The beacon transmits a static GCG UUID as its service
number, 0x004C, as the manufacturer ID for the protocol, and a major and
6AdvertisingSetParameters, Google Developers, https://developer.android.com/
reference/android/bluetooth/le/AdvertisingSetParameters
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minor version number to uniquely identify that beacon. The GCG App scans
for the static service number, filters results based on the manufacturer ID, and
retrieves the major and minor version numbers. The app encodes these version
numbers into a template UUID to form a unique device ID for that beacon and
adds it to its proximity trace.
3.1.4 Buffering proximity data for reliability
During each scan, the proximity data collected consists of zero or more device
ID(s) and the corresponding RSSI values that were discovered at that times-
tamp. Performing a service call to send this data to the backend servers con-
sumes power and bandwidth on the phone. Instead of sending this data after
each scan, we buffer it to a SQlite database on the phone and periodically send
the buffered data to the backend in a single batch. This transmission interval
is set to 15 mins. This type of batching amortizes the power and network costs
across scans, while ensuring the freshness of the data available at the backend.
Buffering is also beneficial when Internet connectivity is intermittent. If the
proximity data cannot be sent to the backend, the buffered data is retained on
the device and a resend attempt is made in the next transmission interval.
Given that this is the most frequent service call to the backend, we use a
compact binary serialization to represent the proximity data sent to the back-
end, unlike the other services which use JSON.
3.1.5 Telemetry for app health monitoring
The GCG App needs to run in the background all the time for effective Blue-
tooth advertising, scanning, and proximity data collection. However, the het-
erogeneity of smartphone models and the limitations of their OS means that this
advertising and scanning may not be reliable. To identify issues with specific
device models and app installations, and verify if the app is running, we collect
and report liveliness telemetry statistics to the backend every hour. These in-
clude a count of BLE scans performed, BLE scans failed, GPS scans, GCG users
and beacons detected, and contact buffer size; Bluetooth and GPS enabled sta-
tus, Bluetooth and GPS permission flags, battery level, app version, etc. These
statistics also help us in understanding the aggregate usage of the GCG App
within an institution.
3.1.6 UI and Analytics
Besides tracking Bluetooth contact data, the GCG App offers several features
to inform the users about COVID-19 and engage them in preventing its spread.
Screenshots of these UI elements are shown in Figure 3.
Key among these is a Proximity Alert, wherein a notification is triggered
on the smartphone if 5 or more users (configurable) were detected within a
≈ 2 m distance during the last Bluetooth scan. This acts as a warning to users
in case they inadvertently overlook social distancing. As discussed later, the
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Figure 3: User interface and analytics in the GoCoronaGo v0.7 Android App
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2 m distance threshold is just an estimate based on the RSSI. The alert is also
triggered only once an hour (configurable) to avoid saturating the user.
In addition, users can visualize a plot of the hourly count of contacts segre-
gated by the duration of contact within the hour, e.g., < 10 mins, 10−20 mins
and > 20 mins (Figure 3b). This gives them a sense of their interaction pattern
for the past 24 hours. Similarly, we also display the number of scans performed
each hour for the past 24 hours (Figure 3c). This can help identify issues with
Bluetooth scanning on specific phones, and prompts the user to take corrective
measures. A summary of the number of scans completed per day is also shown
as a progress bar to motivate users to hit 1000 or more of the 1440 possible
1 min scans (Figure 3a).
These local analytics within the app are complemented by aggregate analytics
performed in the backend and are shared through the app each day. These in-
clude the social distancing score, user density heatmap for neighboring locations,
and a visualization of the contact network neighborhood. These are described
later in Section 4. A unique aspect of the app is that the set of remote analytics
available can be dynamically changed without having to update the app. In the
future, this can also be used to push forms and conduct surveys from within the
app.
Importantly, none of the analytics provided to users reveals the identity of
other users or even their device IDs, to protect their privacy. E.g., the hourly
contact bars only report the aggregate counts of nearby devices and cumulative
duration of interaction at different distances, while the proximity alert is trig-
gered only if at least 3 or more users are nearby to prevent fine-grained estimates
of even the number of GCG users.
Lastly, we also provide helpful information to educate users about COVID-
19. These include a plot of the positive, recovered, and deceased cases across
time in India, and in the local state, and a map of the current positive cases
at the state and district level. In addition, we also share Let’s Control COVID
and Curious about COVID? infographics as app alerts each day, which suggest
precautions, debunk myths, and offer scientific information (Figure 3f). These
are sourced from public health and science resources such as WHO 7, the COVID
Gyan initiative from IISc-TIFR 8, and Indian Scientists’ Response to COVID-
19 9.
3.1.7 Android and iOS implementations
The features described here are largely applicable to GoCoronaGo v0.7 on An-
droid smartphones. GoCoronaGo v0.2 is a lighter version available for iOS with
features limited to advertising, scanning, and receiving alerts. This is due to
the limited numbers of iPhone users on the academic campus.
7Information for the public, World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/
westernpacific/emergencies/covid-19/information
8COVID Gyan, TIFR and IISc, https://covid-gyan.in/
9Indian Scientists’ Response to CoViD-19, https://indscicov.in/
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There are other OS and device-specific issues as well that we encountered
and addressed in various iterations of the app. While we were initially using
wildcard filters when performing Bluetooth scans for service numbers on the
Android app, we noticed that certain phone models such as Samsung did not
reliably perform such scans. This led us to adopt the 0x1800 approach.
Continuous Bluetooth advertisement and scanning in the background is chal-
lenging in Android, and virtually impossible in iOS. Smartphone brands with
custom Android builds, such as Xiaomi, Oppo, Vivo, etc. do not always sup-
port the recommended practise of executing such applications as a foreground
service with a persistent, ongoing notification 10. As a result, users are forced
to change the Android battery usage settings and/or autostart permissions for
the GCG App, which are brand and even model specific. Absence of reliable
scanning and advertising defeats the key purpose of the app. We provide local
analytics and alerts to help users address such issues. Further, Android requires
users to enable GPS to even perform continuous Bluetooth scanning, as a way
to indicate to users that their location may be revealed indirectly, say, through
beacons at well-known locations. But requiring GPS to be on even though the
app does not collect the GPS location without opt-in confuses users, and may
lead to privacy concerns.
On iOS, the problems with background Bluetooth advertisement and scan-
ning is well documented due to Apple’s restrictive policies [16,20,27]. The iOS
GCG App is effective when in the foreground and the user is viewing the app.
However, when the user is not actively using the app or the phone is locked,
the app can scan for other devices that are advertising, but it cannot adver-
tise. As a result, there needs to be other Android or active iOS GCG devices
nearby for contacts to be recorded, colloquially referred to as “Android Herd
Immunity” [32].
Besides technical challenges, there are also policy challenges in deploying
COVID-19 related Android and iOS apps to the Google Play and Apple App
stores. Certification from an official Government of India agency with specific
verbiage was required before the GCG Android app would even be reviewed for
hosting on the Play store, and the subsequent reviews of the app’s updates take
a week or longer. Given the restrictions that Apple imposes on apps posted
on its App Store, the iOS GCG App is only viable for an ad hoc or enterprise
license deployment.
3.2 Design of the GCG Backend Services
GCG web services, data management, and analytics are hosted on the Microsoft
Azure Public Cloud. As shown in Figure 4, these are present on different Virtual
Machines (VMs) that are segregated based on their workload (service endpoint,
data management, analytics), and their security zone (Internet, Intranet, and
internal). We describe these backend capabilities next.
10Services overview, Google Developers https://developer.android.com/guide/
components/services
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Figure 4: Backend VMs, services and databases, and their interactions
3.2.1 Internet-facing services
A suite of REST service Application Programming Interface (API) is defined for
the GCG App to interface with the backend, to upload data and to download
analytics and alerts. The REST services are implemented using Java Servlets
running on Apache Tomcat Web Server, and their service endpoints are accessi-
ble on the Internet. These APIs include register device, add proximity contacts,
add GPS, add liveliness, get notifications, and fetch analytics. Most use JSON
as the REST body, except add contacts which uses a binary protocol.
The register device API accepts an invitation code from the app, checks a
MariaDB table if the code is present, not expired and not yet used, and if so,
generates a random device UUID, a random PIN and a unique ID for the user,
which are returned back to the app. These mappings, as described earlier, are
maintained in MariaDB. The phone number, if provided, is salted, hashed and
stored in the database for comparison in the future if a user reinstalls the app.
The number is also asymmetrically encrypted and stored in the database, so that
it can be decrypted upon authorization by the institution’s advisory board, if
needed. The decryption key is store securely off-cloud to prevent accidental
breaches.
The add contact API is most frequently invoked, once every 15 mins by
potentially 1000’s of users. To avoid the power, compute, and network overheads
of de/serializing JSON, we use an alternative binary format. It starts with
16 bytes of the source device ID, which is followed by a series of scan records,
one per scan. Each record starts with a 4 bytes of UNIX epoch time in seconds
with the scan record’s timestamp. The next 1 byte indicates the number of
device contacts ‘n’ in that scan, followed by 17 × n bytes having the 16 byte
device ID and 1 byte RSSI value for the n proximate devices. If more than
n = 255 devices are found in one scan, the app creates multiple scan records.
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Records are created and sent by the app even if there are no proximate devices,
since this information is also useful. As mentioned before, beacons are also
encoded as device IDs following a standard UUID template.
Intuitively, each record forms an adjacency list for the contact graph. The
binary records from service calls from all users are appended to a file and every
2 hours, a pre-processing service fetches these binary files and generates a cor-
responding CSV file with an edge list consisting of the timestamp, source device
ID, sink device ID, and RSSI. This CSV file is backed up to Azure BLOB store
and, as discussed later, stored on HDFS for further analytics.
Add GPS is the next frequently called API, every 5 mins, for users who
choose to share their GPS location. This data is used to generate a device
density heatmap of the user’s neighborhood for the recent past, and potentially
for contact tracing. To support such spatio-temporal queries, we use the In-
fluxDB temporal database to store the GPS data. One copy of the latitude and
longitude is asymmetrically encrypted and stored in InfluxDB, along with the
timestamp, to support authorized contact tracing. Another copy is transformed
using a GeoHash [44] of 7 characters, which reduces the precision of the location
to a 150m×150m grid. When generating the heatmap for the app user’s current
location, we query over this GeoCode.
The app communicates hourly device health data using the add liveliness
API, as a set of key–value pairs that has evolved over app versions. As a result,
we store this data within Azure Cosmos DB, which is a NoSQL database. This
data is later queried for identifying devices that are not reporting Bluetooth data
reliably and to send them alerts with possible fixes, and also for monitoring the
overall status of the GCG deployment at an institution.
Alerts are sent to the app using a custom notification service in the backend
that the app polls every 5 mins. This approach was initially chosen over Google
or Apple’s push notifications to reduce the dependence on external services.
Alerts that are generated by various analytics are inserted into a MariaDB
table with the device ID, title, content, type, and validity time range. When an
app polls the service, any pending alerts for that device are returned. Besides
displaying alerts to the user, they may also have a special payload that triggers
changes to the UI, such as updating the social distancing score on the main
screen.
User-level analytics such as displaying their contact network and other an-
alytics such as the user density are sent to the app as HTML that is locally
rendered. The app invokes a get analytics API which returns a JSON contain-
ing a list of current endpoints that serve the analytics. The plots and maps are
served off an Apache 2 instance. Separately, we also run our own Open Street
Maps tileserver for serving the map tiles.
These external-facing services are hosted on a separate set of VMs over which
the services are distributed based on their workload and to avoid performance
interference. These VMs are shown in orange in Figure 4. We use one Azure
D2s v3 VMs to host the register device, add gps, and add liveliness endpoints,
a second one that exclusively runs the add contact and another to run the
get notifications service; the latter two see a higher load. The tileserver for
18
displaying open street maps, which is only occasionally used, runs off an Azure
B2S VM, while the analytics are served from an Azure D2s v3 VM. A separate
Azure D4s v3 VM hosts MariaDB and InfluxDB used by these services.
3.2.2 Internal services
Besides the Internet-facing services, there are internal services to support the
GCG platform. These are used to host an operations portal to oversee the health
of the system, on-boarding of devices, and visualize the contact network. The
portal does not directly access any user database or files to prevent accidental
access to or modifications of the raw data. Instead, a separate routing service
offers a limited set of well-defined services to access authorized data. These
APIs are periodically called and the results are cached in a separate MariaDB
instance used by the portal. The portal and its database are also hosted on
separate VMs, shown in yellow in Figure 4. This sandboxing also extends to
the analytics services, which too do not directly access the user databases for
sending alerts or generating visualizations, but operate through this routing
API.
For example, the liveliness data is fetched every 15mins through this routing
service from Cosmos DB and into MariaDB for the portal to visualize the num-
ber of scan records received and scans failed among the apps, while the device
registration summary is fetched through the API to plot the users on-boarded
over time, distribution of their device make and models, etc.
3.2.3 Securing the backend platform
Ensuring the security of the services and the data collected by the GCG plat-
form is of paramount importance, and is intrinsic to various design and de-
ployment choices. All the REST endpoints use HTTP/2 with HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS), which forces the use of a Transport Layer Security
(TLS 1.2/SSL) encrypted channel between the GCG App and the backend, and
prevents man-in-the-middle attacks.
Further, all service calls are authenticated based on a device key that is
returned to the app during registration. To ensure that this service call au-
thentication is light-weight, we use a digital signature protocol, which ensures
that each call can be locally validated, without the need for any database (Fig-
ure 5). Specifically, the device key is generated by the backend service as key
= base64(SHA256(device ID, salt)), where salt is a secret phrase
known only to the service. The GCG App encrypts and stores this device key
on the phone. Subsequently, when invoking any backend service, the app sends
its device key, the current timestamp, and a signature, which consists of sign
= base64(SHA256(device ID, timestamp, device key)) as part of
its HTTPS header or body. The service then uses the received device ID to gen-
erate the device key on the fly, and additionally uses the timestamp to generate
the signature. It also verifies if the timestamp passed is recent, for mitigat-
ing replay attacks. If the generated signature matches the received signature,
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the request is valid and is executed. Note that all of these are flowing over an
encrypted HTTPS channel.
Various other best security practises are used. The register device service
takes measures to mitigate brute-force attacks using random invitation codes
and PINs by limiting the number of daily attempts. Internal services such as the
portal are only accessible from the institution’s private network, over VPN, and
are additionally secured using authentication. Firewall rules are used to restrict
access to unused ports. Direct SSH access is not available to any VMs running
services or the database. The Internet-facing VMs are in a separate subnet
from the ones hosting the databases and internal services on Azure to keep the
networks in different security domains. Data flows between the services and
databases/storage is tightly controlled, and a routing service used for internal
services. We run the latest stable release of all software and the latest security
patches to protect against known security flaws.
The MariaDB SQL database follows the principle of least privileges for ac-
cess, and only minimal permissions for SELECT or SELECT/INSERT are given
to user accounts. User-defined functions are disabled. All queries are templa-
tized to avoid SQL code injection. Sensitive data such as phone number and
location are kept hashed and/or encrypted when stored. This prevents pri-
vacy from being compromised even if there is a cloud security breach and the
data is leaked. We use asymmetric public-private keys so that only public keys
are hosted on the VM for encryption and private keys for decryption are kept
securely offline. Contact data is backed up to Azure encrypted BLOB storage.
The backend services have undergone professional vulnerability and pene-
tration testing by Crossbow Labs.11
4 GCG Analytics and Contact Tracing
The GCG App is designed to provide feedback to users on their daily interactions
using simple metrics and contact neighborhoods. Additionally, to improve user
engagement, the app also provides heatmaps of user density and charts and
maps that show the COVID-19 situation in various states and districts around
the country. In this section, we describe these features along with the contact
tracing protocols that are in place if an app user tests positive.
11Crossbow Labs, https://crossbowlabs.com/
20
AB C
D
[8AM,9AM)
[8AM, 9AM) -70
[12PM,1PM)
[12PM, 1PM) -70
[4PM,5PM)
[4PM, 5PM) -60
[9AM,10PM)
[9AM, 10AM) -50
[10AM, 6PM)
[6PM, 7PM) -70
[7PM, 9PM)
[9PM, 10PM) -100
[7PM,9PM)
[7PM, 8PM) -50
[8PM, 9PM) -40
A
B
C
D
8AM-9AM
9AM-10AM
A B
12PM-1PM
B C
4PM-5PM
A C
6PM-7PM
C D7PM-8PM
C D8PM-9PM
A C9PM-10PM
-70
-50
-60
-60
-70
-50
-40
-100
−∞
−∞
Figure 6: Sample scan records for an interval and the corresponding interval graph
4.1 Temporal Network Analytics
4.1.1 Creating temporal graphs
We receive contact records from various devices that contain the contact times-
tamp and associated Bluetooth signal value. For efficient primary and secondary
contact tracing, we periodically stitch these contact records to create a global
contact network graph. Further, we annotate the edges with the contact times-
tamps and signal values to creating a temporal contact network or a Temporal
Graph.
We use Apache Spark to perform this stitching from the CSV edge file, as a
pre-processing step. Specifically, we create an interval graph for scans received
during a specific time interval. The Spark application takes a start and end time
for the interval, and then filters in all the edge list entries in the input CSV file
whose timestamp falls within this time interval. It then groups all edges by their
source and sink vertices to create an adjacency list for each vertex that includes
all scan entries from either source or sink edges. Every edge is characterised by
a time interval [ts, te), where ts is the earliest scan timestamp and te is the latest
scan timestamp between the connecting devices, during that interval. Scans on
an edge that fall on adjacent time points with the same RSSI value are combined
to form longer intervals on the edge annotations. This gives a set of disjoint
sub-intervals on the edge with an associated Bluetooth signal strength. The
output is stored in HDFS for future analysis.
Figure 6 is an example interval graph obtained for a 24 hour time period.
The interval has scan records for 4 devices A–D, for 8 contiguous time periods.
Consider devices A and C, which come in contact 3 times with the earliest
contact time being 9 AM and the last contact time being 10 PM . The edge
between A and C will thus span the time interval [9 AM, 10 PM). This is further
broken into sub-intervals: [9 AM, 10 AM), [10 AM, 6 PM), [6 PM, 7 PM),
[7 PM, 9 PM), and [9 PM, 10 PM), with corresponding signal strengths of
−80, −∞, −70, −∞, and −100 respectively. A signal of −∞ means the devices
could not see each other, such as devices A and C between [10 AM, 6 PM) and
[7 PM, 9 PM).
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4.1.2 Social Distancing scores
The social distancing score provides users with a measure of their extent of
social distancing, on a daily basis. Unlike the local Bluetooth data used to plot
the contact counts on an hourly basis within the app, the social distancing score
uses more global knowledge from a device and its neighbors. In particular, it
accounts for “background devices” that are often or always in the vicinity, such
as family members or hostel room neighbors, and which are subtracted from
this score as their sustained presence does not pose any additional risk.
These scores are calculated using Apache Giraph once a day, over the interval
graph created for the preceding 24 hour period. The score calculation depends
on three parameters: signal threshold (δ), minimum contact duration (φm), and
background contact duration (φb). For each device ID, we first identify those
neighboring devices that could detect each other for at least φb mins, cumula-
tively, during the 24 hour period. These neighbors form the background devices
and are eliminated from further analysis. Currently, we use φb = 240 mins.
Next, from the remaining neighbors, we retain only the RSSI entries which
exceed a value of δ on their edge sub-intervals. This helps identify the duration
of nearby contacts with them. Based on experiments described in the next
section, we set δ = −78, which approximates a distance of 2 m. We sum up the
duration of nearby contacts for each edge, and those whose duration is greater
than φm mins form the proximate contacts, p. We set φm = 15mins by default.
Intuitively, this means that the user has interacted with p other devices in close
physical proximity of about ≤ 2 m for a cumulative of 15 mins or more in
the past 24 hours, but who are not part of the sustained background presence.
From this, the social distancing score for a device is calculated as max{0, 10−p}.
This normalization offers a higher score for users who practise social distancing
and a lower score for the others.
In the example snapshot, assume that δ = −60, φm = 30 mins and φb =
180 min. For the device C, devices B and D are proximate contacts since their
close contact durations are 1 hr and 2 hrs, respectively. However, A is not
a proximate neighbour of C since it is a part of its background, having been
detected for a total of 3 hrs. So the social distancing score of C is 8.
4.2 Translating RSSI to Distance Measures
The SARS-CoV-2 virus is currently assumed to spread by ‘contact and droplet’
as well as airborne transmission [3]. WHO and various countries have provided
social distancing advisories that emphasize a minimum spacing of 1–2 m for
curbing the spread of the virus [1, 3, 8, 22, 23]. Being able to nudge users to
maintain such distancing is one of the goals of the GCG App.
However, inferring distances accurately from Bluetooth RSSI values is non-
trivial. Factors such as smartphone hardware variations, body interference, and
multi-path interference lead to both false-positives and false-negatives while
estimating the distance from RSSI values [26,60].
Researchers elsewhere have conducted experiments to understand if contact
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tracing apps can estimate if two users are close to each other, i.e., within a dis-
tance of 2m for 15mins or longer [40]. These were performed with Google Pixel
2 and Samsung Galaxy A10 devices using the OpenTrace App12, an open-source
version of Singapore’s TraceTogether App [47]. They used different environmen-
tal conditions such as signal attenuation by the human body, a handbag, walls,
etc. and also by enacting real-world scenarios. The measured RSSI and the
distance are plotted over time to understand the variability for different config-
urations and their relationship to the ground truth.
Another Smart Contract Tracing (SCT) System [46] uses machine learning
classifiers to classify the contacts as high/low risk using the Bluetooth RSSI
values. They perform experiments to collect RSSI from a Nokia 8.1 with An-
droid 10 and HTC M9 with Android 7.0 for distances ranging from 0.2–5 m,
and for random device orientations, and at different locations such as hand,
pocket, and backpack. The collected data is labelled as +1 (high-risk, ≤ 2 m)
or -1 (low-risk) according to the ground truth. They filter the data using a mov-
ing average filter before training using machine learning classifiers like decision
tree, linear discriminant analysis, naïve Bayes, k nearest neighbors, and support
vector machine.
The Google-Apple Exposure Notification API in Android also applies BLE
calibration corrections based on manual measurement of the signal strength
under standard conditions 13.
Given the hardware diversity we observe among our campus population,
we conduct similar lab-scale experiments, as described, using a more diverse
number of smartphones and beacons. We evaluate the effect of RSSI at 1, 2,
and 4 m distances to help us determine whether two phones are within 2 m.
4.2.1 Experiment Design
We use a debug version of the GoCoronaGo Android and iOS apps that log the
Bluetooth scan information to a local file on the smartphone in our experiments.
The experiment was performed in an open room measuring about 5 × 5 m
with few furniture, mimicking a real-world environment. Our experiment uses
9 Android devices, 2 iPhones, and 3 Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacons
running both stock and custom Android OSes: Motorola Moto G6 (Android
v9), two Motorola Moto G5S Plus (v8.1), Xiaomi Mi A3 (v9), Xiaomi Redmi
Note 8 (Android v9, MIUI v11.0.2), Samsung Galaxy M31 (Android v10, One
UI Core 2.0), Samsung Galaxy S9+ (Android v10, One UI 2.1), OPPO A1K
(Android v9, ColorOS v6.0.1), and Vivo Y91i (Android v8.1, Funtouch OS
v4.5), iPhone 7 (iOS v13.5) and iPhone XR (iOS v13.6). The BLE beacons
from TechoLabz use the iBeacon protocol and transmit at −3 dBm at 1 sec
advertising intervals.
All the devices were used at a high battery level, with power-saving modes
12OpenTrace, https://github.com/opentrace-community
13Exposure Notifications BLE RSSI calibration procedure, Google Developers,
https://developers.google.com/android/exposure-notifications/ble-
attenuation-procedure
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Figure 7: Experimental setup for collecting RSSI values at fixed distances
disabled and screen set to stay on for as long as possible while performing the
Bluetooth scans. Each experiment configuration was performed for a period of
10 mins to give ≈ 10 RSSI measurements per device pair in that configura-
tion. Given the technical limitations of iOS, Android devices can detect other
Android devices and the Beacons, and iPhones can detect the Android devices.
Considering these factors, two experimental setups were designed to collect the
RSSI data as illustrated in Figure 7.
For the distance a = 1 m, we use a hexagonal placement, as shown in
Figure 7a, with pairs of devices at the vertices, A, B, C, D, E, F, and the
center, G. These give us devices at distances of 0 m (same vertex); 1 m, between
adjacent vertices, e.g., A–B; 2 m, between vertices at diagonal corners, e.g., A–
D; and
√
3 m for vertices that are 2 hops away, e.g., A–C. Three runs with the
hexagonal setup are required to ensure that every pair of devices is measured
at a 1 m distance.
For distances a = 2 m and 4 m the devices were arranged in 3 clusters, A, B,
C, at the corners on an equilateral triangle with a side of length a (Figure 7b.
In each cluster, the devices are placed vertically and adjacent to each other, in
a row. Devices across clusters are separated by a distance a while those within
a cluster have a distance of ≈ 0 m. Three runs of the triangular setup with
different clusters are performed to ensure that we get the RSSI for each pair of
devices at 2 m and 4 m.
4.2.2 Modeling proximity distances using RSSI values
A key rationale for this study is to understand if two devices are within 2 m
of each other or not, as we use the 2 m distance as the proximity threshold
in our platform. A total of 1988 RSSI data points at 1 m, 2865 data points
at 2 m, and 2321 data points for 4 m are collected. We focus our analysis on
just the Android phones, which form the bulk of our deployment. There are
1073, 1746, and 1377 data points for 1, 2, and 4 m between the Android devices,
respectively. For each distance and a device pair, we drop the maximum and
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1, 2 and 4 m
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at 2 m and 4 m
Figure 8: Distribution of RSSI at different distances for the Android phones
minimum RSSI values to eliminate outliers.
An empirical Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the RSSI values at
1, 2, and 4m are shown in Figure 8a. The X-axis shows the RSSI values while the
Y-axis lists the corresponding percentiles for different distance configurations.
We see that there is a substantial overlap between data points at the 3 different
distances for a given RSSI. E.g., for an RSSI of ≤ −75, we have 23% of the 1 m
data points, 54% of the 2 m data points and 84% of the 4 m data points fall
within that signal strength. So, using any single threshold value of RSSI as an
estimate for a 2 m distance is liable to result in both false positives and false
negatives.
For this preliminary study, we wish to determine an RSSI value that is the
most discriminating with regard to the ≤ 2 m and > 2 m proximity. So for each
RSSI value, we plot the difference in the percentile of data points that are at
2 m and at 4 m distances, and this is shown in Figure 8b. The peak difference is
observed at an RSSI value of −78, i.e., the difference between the true positive
of 2 m (59%) and false positive of 4 m (29%) is the highest. Hence, we use
an RSSI of −78 as the proximity threshold in our GCG app and the backend
analytics.
In the future, we propose to study the effect on RSSI from different pairs
of phone models and in different environmental conditions in order to develop
a more customized proximity threshold, instead of using a single global value
that is currently adopted.
4.3 Contact Tracing Protocol
When an app user tests positive for COVID or is under mandatory quarantine,
the current protocol at IISc requires the campus health center to check if the
user is willing to share their contact data for tracing. If so, they are asked to
enter their phone number within the GCG App, if not done so. The health
center collects and enters the GCG unique id, device id suffix, and their phone
number from the user into a portal. This initiates a call to the GCG backend
and triggers an OTP to the user’s phone number, if the details match with an
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existing user. The user may share this OTP with the health center and this
serves as their informed consent for contact tracing.
The health center enters the OTP and any additional details about the
subject such as symptoms, start and end dates for contact tracing, and test
information. The GCG backend confirms if the OTP is accurate, and if so, the
request is forwarded to the advisory board to get the primary and secondary
contacts for this user. The advisory board has representatives from the institute,
including faculty, staff, students, doctors, and a bio-ethicist.
If the board approves the request through their portal, the GCG backend
is notified and it will perform a time-respecting breadth first search (T-BFS),
which is a variant of Breadth First Search (BFS) performed over the temporal
contact graph. The T-BFS will be initiated from the device ID corresponding to
the given user’s unique ID and for the time duration in the past indicated by the
health center. If the user’s unique ID is associated with multiple devices during
this period, the search will be initiated from each of these IDs. The output is
a list of device ids for the primary and secondary contacts. We then use the
invitation code, unique ID and device ID mappings maintained in the GCG
backend to get the list of invitation codes used by the primary and secondary
contacts.
These invitation codes are shared with the IT staff who then use their map-
ping table to de-anonymize them and provide the health center with a list of
email IDs and/or phone numbers of these contacts. The GCG backend also
provides the duration of contacts for each of the invite codes. The health center
can then choose to initiate their relevant protocols for reaching out to these
contacts, and quarantine or test them. If mandated by law, the health center
may share the contact trace data with the local government agency responsible
for COVID-19 surveillance.
4.4 Other Analytics and User Engagement
Besides the local analytics within the app, we also provide additional analytics
to the GCG user based on aggregation in the backend.
Figure 3d shows a heatmap of GCG user count in a 1.5 × 1.5 km area
around the current location of an app user, if they share their GPS location.
It is aggregated over the last 24 hours from users who share their GPS data.
This data is queried from the timestamp and geohashes present in the InfluxDB
backend. In order to respect privacy, the location data is spatially coarsened
into tiles of approximately 150 m× 150 m area, and temporally coarsened over
24 hours, and only the aggregate count of users in each tile is shown. Also, when
few users are present in a tile, we display this data in a categorical manner, e.g.,
< 5.
The contact graphs that are constructed in the backend can be visualized
using tools such as Gephi. Figure 9 shows a subset of the temporal graph
generated for a single day. Here, the size of a node depends on its degree
Centrality Measure across the entire time duration. The thickness of the links
depends on the duration of their contact.
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Figure 9: A visualization of the contact graph of a subset of app users for a single
day. The size of the nodes is proportional to their degree centrality.
While such a graph is instructive for backend analytics, we use it to generate
a neighbourhood tree for each user, as shown in Figure 3e. The tree is based
on the last 48 hours of data and contains contacts up to 2-hops. Importantly,
this is a tree and not a neighborhood sub-graph to preserve privacy, i.e., edges
between the 1-hop and 2-hop neighbors are not shown to avoid revealing contact
patterns between them. These trees are generated on a daily basis. It helps the
users get a sense of not just their primary contacts, but also their secondary
contacts, which could be much larger, and in-turn motivate users to take greater
precautions by socially distancing.
5 Discussion
5.1 Deployment Experience
The GCG App is currently deployed at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc),
Bangalore. The IISc campus is an access controlled residential campus with close
to 4,000 students, over 450 faculty, and over 2,000 research and administrative
staff. A majority of the students and faculty live on campus. However, IISc
entered a full shutdown in March, 2020, a few days ahead of a nation-wide
lockdown in India, and the students on campus were instructed to leave for
their homes. Initial versions of the app were tested among faculty volunteers
during the lockdown period. The GCG App was first rolled out to students
in June, 2020 after a subset of them were allowed to re-enter campus, and
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Figure 10: Number of GCG installations at IISc over time
subsequently to other faculty and staff.
At the time of writing this paper, the GCG App has been installed by over
1,000 users at IISc. A plot of the number of installations of the GCG App over
time is shown in Figure 10. Sharp jumps in installations correspond to new
invitations or reminders sent to students, faculty, and staff for installing the app.
The app is yet to be rolled out to essential workers such as hostel cooks, cleaning
staff and security personnel, and noticeably, some of the early cases of COVID-
19 on campus have been initiated through them. This is understandable since
many of them stay off-campus and possibly have a larger mobility footprint,
increasing their risk of acquiring the coronavirus.
While the GCG Android App was initially hosted on the IISc website due
to restrictions by Google and Apple in hosting COVID-related apps on their
online app stores, it has recently received approval to be hosted on the Google
Play Store, with v0.5 currently available there since early August, 2020. An ad
hoc iOS version is also being tested since the last week of August, 2020.
5.2 Federated Deployment
While GCG is designed for institutional use, contact tracing for users from
the same institutions who interact outside the campus is also captured. This
benefit can be further expanded through a federated deployment for institutions
that are spatially close to each other, such as a cluster of college campuses and
software tech-parks in the same neighborhood. Here, the chances of physical
interaction between users from different organizations are high, e.g., visiting the
same local cafeteria or grocery store.
In this federated deployment, individual institutions would maintain their
independent GCG deployments. But in addition, they would share the strictly
anonymized contact graph for their institution with a trusted data broker, such
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Figure 11: Federated deployment of GCG across Institutions
as a non-profit agency or a neutral university. This data broker would then
stitch these graphs together based on contacts between unique device ids that
span graphs from different institutions. This can then be used to trigger “glocal”
analytics – a global combination of local clusters that are near each other – and
share more accurate proximity scores with the users of individual institutions,
as well as perform more effective contact tracing across institutions in the same
community. A key requirement to preserving privacy is that no personal data
should be shared with this trusted broker, and any de-anonymization for contact
tracing should strictly be handled at the local institution.
This can further be complemented through the use of national or regional-
scale contact tracing apps, even if used by a smaller fraction of users who are
mobile. This can help link clusters of GCG contacts within institutions, and
allow with contact tracing beyond the institutional premises as well. However,
care should be taken to sandbox the regional and institutional datasets to avoid
privacy loss.
5.3 Research Opportunities
The availability of fine-grained contact tracing data has opened opportunities
for new research on infection spreading. Classic epidemiological models are
compartmentalized formulations that classify the population into different states
such as S (Susceptible), E (Exposed), I (infected), and R (removed/recovered).
Based on the progression patterns of a disease, different models such as SI,
SIS, SIR, and SEIR models [12, 14, 35, 36] have been proposed. These models
are applicable to large populations and can estimate the time evolution of the
fraction of individuals in different states over time, and can identify the peak
number of infections for different Reproduction Numbers. The assumptions in
these models are however coarse and their utility is hence limited. They can
29
be used to take higher-level policy decisions such as deciding the duration of
lockdowns, planning hospital bed-capacity over time, etc. However, the input
data for these models is tightly related to the testing rates, which in the case of
COVID-19 was very low during the initial few months.
Research in the last two decades has extended such compartmentalized mod-
els to static or time-varying contact networks [30,58,59,61]. In a static network,
a node, if infected, can potentially infect any other nodes that it comes in con-
tact with, regardless of the time of contact. But in dynamic networks, temporal
ordering is preserved. That is, if an individual A comes in contact with a person
B before B and C interacted, then A faces no risk from C. This can correct for
the over-prediction of infection rates from static models. With Bluetooth-based
mobile contact tracing, it is possible to include both duration of contact and
the signal strength, which is a proxy for the distance between the phone users
during their interaction, to make better predictions of the transmission rates.
Results from simulated experiments by Kretzschmar et al. [38], indicate reduced
reproduction numbers when contact tracing is performed using mobile apps as
the delay in alerting vulnerable individuals is reduced to a minimum. Apart
from identifying primary and higher-order contacts quickly, contact data allows
us to identify the most vulnerable users through either simulations of network
models assuming hypothetical initial conditions or centrality measures. Most
centrality scores from network science are defined on static graphs and it would
be interesting to develop better centrality measures that can be used to find
the nodes with higher spreading capabilities in a temporal network. Identifying
such individuals can in-turn be used to device adaptive testing and vaccina-
tion strategies, which can help improve the estimates of the health states of the
population, especially when testing is expensive, or its availability is limited.
Another major opportunity with centralized contact tracing is the ability to
influence social distancing behaviour using alerts and scores. Creating control
groups and providing such information to one of them and observing their con-
tact patterns for a limited subsequent period can throw light on the effect of
such scores. Such randomized control trials can help quantify the effectiveness
of contact tracing apps even in the absence of COVID-19 case data.
5.4 Challenges
One of the key challenges with digital contact tracing is user adoption. As
highlighted in Section 2, digital contact tracing requires a large fraction of users
within the community to use it before it becomes effective. Having only a small
sample of individuals use the app makes it difficult to identify the true sources of
infection, because of which paths between infected individuals and their primary
and higher-order contacts may go undetected.
However, our experience with institutional-level contact tracing appears
more promising than that employed by governments at a national level in terms
of the fraction of users installing an app and the duration for which they had
it installed on their phones. In fact, recent reports indicate that even 15% of
user adoption of contact tracing apps can have a meaningful impact of 6–8%
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reduction in COVID infections and death [10]. That said, not all workplaces are
captive environments. In such cases, neighborhood or regional deployments of
contact tracing apps may be required since they are more likely to interact with
people outside their cluster. Further, people may also interact during activities
outside workplaces and their institutional contact tracing app can be ineffective
during these periods.
We frequently observe app users turn off their Bluetooth or GPS, because
of which the contact trace data collected is curtailed. Users may do so to save
battery – even though our experience shows that the Android app consumes
less than 10% of batter in an entire day – or when they perceive a lower risk
based on their current activity and environmental conditions. These factors
can dramatically offset the promises offered by network-based epidemiological
models in identifying risk-prone individuals and in contact tracing to contain
the spread of infection. It is also extremely difficult to impute such missing data
and no assumption can be confidently justified.
Although digital contact tracing apps have several potential advantages, vali-
dating its usefulness is tough. The difference between the two approaches can be
best demonstrated when there are COVID positive app users who have shared
data for continuous periods. In practice, it is wise to use data from such tools
in conjunction with manual contact tracing since there would be gaps in data
due to user behaviour or technology limitations. Building robust epidemiologi-
cal models is all the more challenging because they contain several parameters
that have to be calibrated from sparse and missing data. Heavy reliance on
digital contact tracing apps can also exclude fractions of the community who
use feature phones. Visitors to institutions such as delivery providers can also
be missed out but can contribute to virus spreading.
Digital contact tracing is still in its infancy. It is important that individuals
understand the data shared, risks, and benefits before fully using such apps.
Communicating these details to a lay audience can be challenging and miscon-
ceptions about what such apps collect and can do are not uncommon.
6 Conclusions
In this article, we have described the various dimensions of digital contact trac-
ing for managing the COVID-19 pandemic. We have highlighted the approaches
taken by diverse apps globally, and their pros and cons. We have proposed Go-
CoronaGo as an institutional contact tracing app, whose design choices attempt
to balance the privacy of individuals with the safety of the community in per-
forming rapid multi-hop contact tracing. We have offered a detailed technical
description of the GCG App, its backend services, and analytics. This plat-
form is currently being validated at the IISc university campus, with additional
campus deployments underway. We have shared our early experiences with the
deployment over the past few months, in the midst of the COVID-19 epidemic,
and the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. Given the evolving nature
of COVID-19, our continued experience with this contact tracing platform at
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IISc and other campuses can serve as a role model, or a cautionary tale, in
managing the pandemic in the ensuing months and years.
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Special Terms
Application Programming Interface (API)
Application Programming Interface (API) is a description of the input
and output parameters that are received and returned when accessing a
capability offered by an application.
Bluetooth
Bluetooth is a wireless technology standard for short-range communication
between mobile devices such as laptops and smart phones, with a practical
range of up to 10 m meters.
Bluetooth Beacon
Bluetooth Beacon is a compact device that can be configured to continu-
ously broadcast an identifier and some custom data as part of a Bluetooth
signal. Other Bluetooth-enabled devices can detect these signals to get
information, typically specific to the location of the Beacon.
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is a variant of the Bluetooth standard which
uses much lesser power for communication, allowing it to be enabled all
the time. It is widely used in smart phones, wearables, beacons and smart
home devices.
Breadth First Search (BFS)
Breadth First Search (BFS) is a graph algorithm designed to visit all ver-
tices that have a path from a particular source vertex. It begins by visiting
the immediate neighbours of the source vertex, proceeds to visit the im-
mediate neighbours of the newly visited vertices if they are unvisited, and
so on.
Centrality Measure
Centrality Measure is a graph-theoretic score that measures the relative
importance of vertices in their ability to spread or influence other vertices
in the network. Examples of these measures include degree, betweenness,
Eigenvalue, closeness centrality, Page Rank, etc. They are used to identify
important or critical vertices in contact networks, social networks, WWW
graphs, road networks, etc.
Contact Tracing
Contact Tracing is the process of identifying people might be at risk due
to physical interactions with a disease carrier.
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Digital Contact Tracing
Digital Contact Tracing refers to the use of technology, such as mobile
phone apps, QR codes, wearable devices and video analytics, to assist
with contact tracing.
GeoHash
GeoHash is a mechanism to encode a location in the form of a compact
sequence of alphabets and numbers that are easy to remember, compared
to latitude and longitude. Typically, longer hashes offer a higher precision
of the location.
Public Cloud
Public Cloud is an Internet-based service that allows users to rent and ac-
cess remote computation, storage and software capabilities that are hosted
at large data centers offered managed by service providers like Microsoft,
Amazon, and Google. It reduces the cost and effort in managing physical
computing infrastructure at an organization, and at a higher reliability
and scalability.
QR Code
Quick Response (QR) Code is a 2-D barcode standard which serves as a
machine or device readable label that encodes information. Smart phones
can use their cameras to take a picture of the QR Code and Apps or
libraries can extract the information present in them. Examples of such
information include some identifier, the physical location or a URL to a
website.
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) is a measure of the relative
strength of a radio signal received by a device. Higher values indicate
a stronger signal strength. The RSSI is affected by the radio chipset,
strength at which the signal is transmitted and environmental factors.
Reproduction Number
Reproduction Number R0 of a pandemic is the number of individuals
expected to be infected in a population as a direct result of a single person
being infected, when all the other individuals are susceptible to the disease,
i.e., have not been vaccinated or have not already acquired the disease.
REST
Representational State Transfer (REST) is a software architecture that
allows desktop and mobile clients to interact with Internet services by
passing requests and receiving responses, using web standards such as
HTTP and data models like JSON.
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Social Distancing
Social Distancing is the practice of maintaining physical distance between
individuals to prevent the spread of face-to-face communicable diseases.
A 1.5–2 m distance is recommended for COVID-19.
Temporal Graph
Like a regular graph, a Temporal Graph (or Temporal Network) is a col-
lection of vertices and edges between vertices that indicate a relationship
between them. But the vertices and edges that exist at different points
in time may vary, and their attributes may also change over time. E.g.,
temporal graphs model interactions in a social network, traffic flow in a
road network and proximity contacts in a contact tracing network.
Virtual Machines (VMs)
A Virtual Machine (VM) is a computing environment that provides all the
functionalities of a full computer, but itself is executing within another
computer. A VM is the typical unit of renting a computer in public
clouds. VMs help divide a single large computer or server in the cloud
into multiple smaller computers, and the VMs are independently rented
to different users.
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